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ABSTRACT 
Firms do not historically call their convertible bonds as soon as conversion can be forced. 
A number of explanations for the delay rely on the size of the dividends that bondholders 
forgo so long as they do not convert. We investigate an important change in convertible 
security design, namely, dividend protection of convertible bond issues. Dividend 
protection means that the conversion value of the convertible bond is unaffected by 
dividend payments and that dividend-related rationales for call delay become moot. We 
document that call delay is near zero for dividend-protected convertible bonds. 
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This paper documents the rapid rise of callable convertibles that are dividend-protected, 
and the ensuing effect on convertible bond call policy. When a convertible is dividend-
protected and a dividend is distributed, the number of shares to be received upon 
conversion increases so as to leave the bond’s conversion value unchanged. We find that 
call delay is near zero for dividend-protected convertible bonds. The link between 
dividend protection and diminished call delay highlights the importance of dividends for 
understanding convertible bond call policy. 
Calling a convertible bond will force conversion provided the conversion value 
exceeds the call price. Ingersoll (1977a) and Brennan and Schwartz (1977) model settings 
in which shareholder wealth is maximized by calling to force conversion whenever 
feasible. Forced conversion deprives convertible bondholders of the combined value of 
the insurance they have as bondholders able to demand the bond’s principal value at 
maturity (rather than the bond’s conversion value at maturity) and any income advantage 
from the coupons they receive in excess of the dividends received in the event of 
conversion. Ingersoll (1977b) documents that in practice a substantial number of firms 
delay calling relative to this policy, reporting that on average firms wait until the 
conversion value exceeds the call price by 43.9%.  
Asquith and Mullins (1991) observe that studies on call delay are important since a 
failure to empirically confirm clear predictions of finance theory calls into question the 
validity of the models. Not surprisingly, researchers have responded to Ingersoll’s 
analysis by considering alternate theories of convertible bond call policy. Theoretical 
explanations of call delay can be classified into two groups: explanations that are 
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unrelated to the firm’s dividend policy, and explanations that are dependent on the firm’s 
dividend policy.  
There are two explanations unrelated to dividend policy. One is that the costs of a 
failed call along with a required call notice period can lead firms to delay calling until a 
bond’s conversion value exceeds its call price by a sufficient safety premium.1 The other  
is that call delay can be a credible signal that management believes that the conversion 
value of the bond will exceed its face value at maturity and hence that there is little to be 
gained by forcing conversion early since bondholders will convert at maturity (Harris and 
Raviv (1985)).2 
Four additional explanations of call delay are related to the firm’s dividend policy. 
The first two are alternate forms of an argument that a strategy of relying on voluntary 
conversion can dominate forcing conversion via a call and that a necessary condition for 
voluntary conversion is that dividends exceed coupons. The first such explanation, due to 
Ingersoll (1977b), is that if bondholders should be voluntarily converting but are not 
doing so, then shareholders are better off if management does not call, as calling would 
wake the “sleeping investors.”3 The second explanation, proposed by Constantinides and 
Grundy (1986), is that voluntary conversion induced by high dividends avoids the 
underwriting costs of a formal call and any costs associated with failed calls.4  
The third dividend-related rationale for call delay is applicable when forced 
conversion means the loss of a valuable corporate tax shield. Asquith and Mullins (1991), 
Campbell, Ederington, and Vankudre (1991), and Asquith (1995) argue that delay can be 
optimal when the after-tax cost of the coupons that would be paid absent a call is less 
than the post-conversion dividends to be paid to former bondholders.5 This paper 
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proposes a fourth dividend-related rationale for call delay in which delay serves as a 
credible signal that high future dividends are likely to induce voluntary conversion. Less 
optimistic firms will prefer to call and force conversion rather than to allow their 
bondholders to continue to receive coupons in excess of the post-conversion dividends 
that they will receive if forced to convert.  
A recent change in the design of convertible bonds whereby convertibles today are 
dividend-protected is particularly interesting. We establish that all four dividend-related 
rationales for call delay are inapplicable if the convertible is dividend-protected, whereas 
the two non dividend-related rationales imply little or no difference in the delays 
expected for dividend-protected and non dividend-protected convertibles. Thus, we 
predict that if the dividend-related rationales are important, then call delays for dividend-
protected convertible bonds will be less than the delays observed for convertibles without 
dividend protection.  
Ours is the first study of call delays to include dividend-protected convertibles. We 
examine call decisions prior to January 1, 2012 for 471 callable convertible bonds issued 
in the period 2000 to 2008. There are no dividend-protected convertible bonds in our 
sample in 2000, while 61% of the convertibles issued in 2003 are dividend-protected, and 
by 2005 this percentage is 100%. The average call delay is substantial (67.22 days) for 
the non dividend-protected convertible bonds in our sample. For the dividend-protected 
convertibles, the average call delay is only 2.47 days. As predicted, call delay for 
dividend-protected convertibles is less than that for non dividend-protected convertibles – 
in fact, it is near zero. 
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For the non dividend-protected convertibles in our sample, call delay is significantly 
longer for high-dividend firms (181 days on average) than it is for low-dividend firms (18 
days on average), while for the dividend-protected convertibles, the size of the dividend 
is not an important determinant of call delay. This result together with the near-zero call 
delay for dividend-protected convertibles highlight the importance of dividends for 
understanding past call delays, with dividend-related rationales for call delay being the 
dominant determinant of call delay for non dividend-protected convertible bonds. The 
near-zero call delay of dividend-protected convertibles also highlights the importance of 
the early Ingersoll (1977a) and Brennan and Schwartz (1977) predictions of call policy, 
and confirms that finance theory can be highly useful in understanding managerial 
behavior. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I shows that it is never 
optimal to voluntarily convert a dividend-protected convertible bond and establishes that 
all dividend-related rationales for delay are inapplicable when the convertible is dividend-
protected. Section II describes the data set. Section III documents that delays are shorter 
for dividend-protected convertibles than for non dividend-protected convertibles. Section 
III also confirms prior evidence on the importance of dividends for understanding call 
delay by documenting a positive link between delay and dividends for non dividend-
protected convertibles in our more recent sample. Section IV establishes robustness of 
our results by controlling for the role of a safety premium in explaining call delay as well 
as a secular decline in call delay over time. Section V explores possible causes of the 
change in security design, namely, a belief that dividends were likely to increase and the 
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increasing involvement of hedge funds in the convertible bond market. Section VI 
concludes. 
I. Dividend Protection and Call Policy 
Although convertible bonds issued in the 20th century were protected against stock 
dividends, stock splits, and extraordinary cash dividends, the bonds’ conversion rates 
were not adjusted for regular cash dividends. In this section we first describe the 
protection against regular cash dividends that was introduced in the early 2000s. We then 
consider the implications of dividend protection for the set of dividend-related and non 
dividend-related rationales for call delay. 
A. The Mechanics of Dividend Protection 
The first convertible bond issue with full dividend protection in our sample is a 
Vector Group issue in 2001. Most prospectuses of dividend-protected convertibles have a 
sentence describing a conversion rate adjustment of the form “Subject to the terms of the 
indenture, we will adjust the conversion rate for cash dividends or other cash 
distributions to all or substantially all holders of our common stock.” The typical formula 
for the adjustment is  
                                                  1 0
cum div
cum div
SCR CR
S d
= ×
−
 ,                                         (1) 
where CR1 is the conversion rate in effect after the payment of a dividend d per share, 
CR0 is the conversion rate in effect prior to the dividend payment, and cum divS  is the cum-
dividend stock price.6 Dividend protection means that the conversion value of the bond is 
unaffected by the payment of a dividend.7 
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B. Dividend Protection and Voluntary Conversion 
The adjustment given in Equation (1) guarantees that non liquidating dividends will 
not induce voluntary conversion. Bondholders who convert early to capture the dividend 
receive the cum-dividend conversion value of 0 .
cum divCR S×  If the bondholders delay 
conversion, their bonds will be worth at least their ex-dividend conversion value, 
( )1 .cum divCR S d× −  Conversion value provides a lower bound since bondholders have the 
option of demanding the bond’s principal value at maturity. Given the conversion rate 
adjustment, this lower bound on value is 
( ) ( )1 0 0
cum div
cum div cum div cum div
cum div
SCR S d CR S d CR S
S d
 
× − = × − = × − 
. 
Hence, the bondholder is never better off converting early to capture the dividend.  
C. Dividend Protection and Call Policy 
In this section we begin by describing the four dividend-related explanations for call 
delay and show that each explanation is inapplicable if the convertible is dividend-
protected. We then show that both non dividend-related explanations for call delay (the 
safety premium and the Harris and Raviv signaling model) are applicable to dividend-
protected and non dividend-protected convertibles. 
C.1. Dividend Protection, Voluntary Conversion, and Sleeping Investors 
If a call forces conversion, then calling gives the bondholders a claim on the firm 
worth CR V
n CR+
, where CR is the conversion rate, n is the pre-conversion number of 
shares, and V is the value of the firm. Suppose the bond is not dividend-protected and that 
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dividends are such that the convertible bondholders should be voluntarily converting, 
because their claim if they do not convert is worth less than CR V
n CR+
. Further suppose 
that some bondholders are not voluntarily converting because they are asleep. It is then 
optimal to delay calling this non dividend-protected convertible (Ingersoll (1977b)).  
Now suppose instead that the convertible is dividend-protected. We have established 
that it is never in the bondholders’ interest to voluntarily convert a dividend-protected 
bond, which means that their dividend-protected bond is worth at least CR V
n CR+
. As a 
result, sleeping through the opportunity to voluntarily convert is optimal for the 
convertible bondholders, in which case it is in the original shareholders’ best interest to 
call and deprive the bondholder of any extra value the bond might have above its 
conversion value. Thus, while this dividend-related rationale for call delay might help 
explain delays in calling non dividend-protected convertibles, it cannot rationalize a delay 
in calling a dividend-protected convertible. 
C.2. Dividend Protection, Voluntary Conversion, and Costs of Failed Calls 
Voluntary conversion avoids the costs of underwriting a call and any costs associated 
with failed calls. Therefore, if the convertible is not dividend-protected and management 
is confident that dividends will induce voluntary conversion, then relying on voluntary 
conversion can be preferred to forcing conversion (Constantinides and Grundy (1986)). 
But when a convertible is dividend-protected, voluntary conversion is not in the 
bondholders’ interest. Thus, a delay in calling a dividend-protected convertible cannot be 
rationalized by an expectation of high dividends and future voluntary conversion.  
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C.3. Dividend Protection and a Tax-Based Rationale for Call Delay 
Section A of the Appendix formalizes the Asquith and Mullins (1991), Campbell, 
Ederington, and Vankudre (1991), and Asquith (1995) argument that shareholders may 
prefer not to force the conversion of a non dividend-protected convertible if conversion 
means the loss of a valuable tax shield. As shown in the Appendix, if the present value of 
the dividends to be paid to former convertible bondholders forced to convert were to 
exceed the after-tax coupon on the convertible, then a firm may find it optimal not to 
force the conversion of non dividend-protected convertibles.  
However, if the convertible is dividend-protected, Section B of the Appendix shows 
formally that the shareholders are better off by calling and forcing conversion. The 
reasoning is as follows. When the convertible is dividend-protected and conversion is not 
forced, convertible bondholders receive coupon income and enjoy an enhancement of 
their conversion terms in the event of a dividend. In effect, this enhancement 
compensates them for the dividends they would have received if they had converted. If 
forced to convert, the bondholders will receive dividends. From the point of view of the 
firm’s shareholders, what differs between these two scenarios is the after-tax cost of the 
coupon that must be paid so long as the bond is not called.8 Since calling avoids this cost, 
forcing the conversion of an in-the-money dividend-protected convertible dominates 
delay.  
C.4. Dividend Protection and a Dividend-Related Signaling Rationale for Call Delay 
In a dividend-related signaling equilibrium, low-quality firms do not anticipate a 
future dividend increase and call their non dividend-protected convertibles while high-
quality firms delay calling and instead rely on high future dividends to induce voluntary 
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conversion. It would be costly for the shareholders of a low-quality firm to delay calling 
in an effort to increase its current share price since a low-quality firm would continue to 
pay its convertible bondholders coupons in excess of the post-conversion dividends they 
would receive if forced to convert.  
Since a dividend-protected convertible will never be voluntarily converted, a high-
quality firm with a dividend-protected convertible outstanding could not rely on its high 
dividends to induce voluntary conversion. Irrespective of its quality, a firm would owe 
coupons on its dividend-protected convertibles so long as it did not force conversion, and 
call delay would not be more costly for low-quality firms than for high-quality firms.  As 
such, no dividend-related signaling equilibrium exists if the convertible is dividend-
protected, and shareholders are always better off by calling and forcing conversion.9  
C.5. Dividend Protection and the Safety Premium Rationale for Call Delay 
Firms might delay calling until a bond’s conversion value exceeds its call price by a 
sufficient amount, so that the likelihood of a subsequent share price decline that would 
lead the bondholders not to convert at the end of the notice period is considered low 
enough. Asquith and Mullins (1991) investigate a 20% safety premium and state that in 
practice managers use a 20% to 25% rule. This rationale applies equally to dividend-
protected and non dividend-protected convertibles. 
C.6. Dividend Protection and the Harris-Raviv Signaling Rationale for Call Delay 
Harris and Raviv (1985) develop a signaling model (the HR model) in which high-
quality firms delay calling non dividend-protected convertible bonds and low-quality 
firms call non dividend-protected convertible bonds. The model assumes that conversion 
at maturity is more likely to occur for high-quality firms and hence that the value of the 
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insurance that convertible bondholders retain so long as the bond is not called is larger for 
low-quality firms. If a low-quality firm were to delay calling in order to mimic a high-
quality firm, it would allow its bondholders to retain this valuable insurance. The Harris 
and Raviv (1985) model assumes for simplicity that the underlying firm does not pay 
dividends prior to the convertible’s maturity.  
For dividend protection to be relevant in a HR-type signaling model, it must be the 
case that the underlying firm pays dividends, and the HR model can be generalized to 
allow for dividends. However, a necessary condition for the existence of a HR signaling 
equilibrium is that the bondholders do not voluntarily convert in order to capture the 
dividend, as the insurance feature could then never pay off. This condition requires that 
dividends be sufficiently small if the HR model is to explain a delay in calling a non 
dividend-protected convertible.10  
When the dividend is sufficiently small, there will only be a minor change to the 
conversion rate of a dividend-protected convertible after a dividend payment. It can be 
shown that if the initial conversion rate of a dividend-protected convertible is set such 
that the dividend-protected convertible has the same value at the time of issue as a non 
dividend-protected convertible, and if a HR signaling equilibrium exists for a non 
dividend-protected convertible, then a HR signaling equilibrium will also likely exist for 
a dividend-protected convertible. As a result, to the extent that call delays for non 
dividend-protected convertibles reflect a HR signaling equilibrium, then dividend-
protected convertibles issued by otherwise equivalent firms will exhibit a similar call 
delay.11 
C.7. The Relation Between Dividend Protection and Call Delay 
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Sections I.C.1 to I.C.4 above show that the four dividend-related rationales for call 
delay are only applicable when the convertible is non dividend-protected and hence, 
while a delay in calling a non dividend-protected convertible might be explained by 
future dividends, a delay in calling a dividend-protected convertible cannot be so 
rationalized. Sections I.C.5 and I.C.6 show that when either of the two non dividend-
related rationales explain the delay in calling a non dividend-protected convertible, we 
would expect to see a similar delay in calling an otherwise equivalent dividend-protected 
convertible.  
We conclude that call delays for dividend-protected convertibles will be either 
shorter or comparable to delays for non dividend-protected convertibles. If call delays are 
shorter for dividend-protected convertibles than for non dividend-protected convertibles, 
then call delays must be explained at least in part by one or more of the dividend-related 
explanations. Further, if call delays for non dividend-protected convertibles are entirely 
explained by one or more of the dividend-related explanations, then dividend-protected 
convertibles will be called without delay and call delays will only be observed for non 
dividend-protected convertibles.   
II. Data 
We identify the set of convertible bonds issued by U.S. industrial companies over the 
period January 2000 to December 2008 by examining the Securities Data Company 
(SDC) database of new corporate issues. We require that the issuing firms have an 
offering prospectus available on the SEC’s Edgar database and that the convertibles have 
call features.12 We exclude convertible preferred stock, exchangeable securities, 
convertibles issued in units with equity, and floating rate convertibles. This leaves 471 
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convertible bond issues that have call features and for which we have detailed 
information on their design characteristics. Most dividend-protected convertibles have 
protection in the form of the adjustment to the conversion terms given by Equation (1) for 
all cash dividends, regardless of the size of the dividend. However, a subset of issues only 
provides protection when the cash dividend exceeds a specified dollar amount or a 
specified dividend yield. The specified levels are typically relatively low and are called a 
“dividend threshold.” For example, the prospectus for a 2004 Reebok International issue 
states that  
“the conversion rate will be adjusted if we make regular cash dividends to 
all or substantially all holders of our common stock in excess of $0.15 per 
share in any semi-annual period.” 
Reebok paid a semi-annual dividend of exactly $0.15 per share in 2004 and 2005 
(representing an annual dividend yield of about 0.7%) and the conversion rate was not 
adjusted in these years.  
In our empirical analysis we only classify a convertible with a dividend threshold as 
dividend-protected when the threshold multiplied by the conversion rate is smaller than 
the after-tax coupon. When the dividend threshold multiplied by the conversion rate is 
larger than the after-tax coupon, a firm could potentially justify not calling on the basis of 
the tax wedge argument if it were to pay the threshold dividend.  
Our sample of 471 convertible bonds contains 43 convertible bonds with a minimum 
threshold amount expressed in dollar terms and 26 convertible bonds with a minimum 
threshold dividend yield. For 40 of the 43 convertible bonds with a minimum dollar 
threshold amount, the conversion rate multiplied by the threshold dividend amount per 
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share is less than the after-tax coupon and we classify these bonds as protected.13 For the 
other three bonds the partial protection could potentially be used to justify not calling and 
hence we classify these bonds as unprotected.   
The 26 bonds in our sample with relatively low threshold dividend yields have 
threshold yields of 1%, 1.25%, 1.4%, 2%, 2.5%, and 3.75%. For 12 of the 26 convertible 
bonds the conversion rate times the threshold dividend yield times the stock price at the 
time of the convertible’s issuance is less than the after-tax coupon. We classify these 
convertible bonds as dividend-protected and classify the remaining 14 bonds with 
threshold yields as unprotected.14  
Panel A of Table I provides descriptive statistics for the 471 convertible bonds. We 
observe that 60% of the convertible bonds are protected against regular cash dividends. 
Panel B shows the percentage of convertible bonds with dividend protection by year of 
issue. Consistent with observations in Choi, Getmansky, and Tookes (2009) and Lewis 
and Verwijmeren (2011), a relatively high number of convertibles are issued in 2001, 
2003, and 2004. Before 2003, the vast majority of convertible bonds are not dividend-
protected, while after 2003 the large majority of convertibles bonds are dividend-
protected. Table II shows whether and how the convertible bonds in our sample are 
retired. We search for information on call announcements in Factiva, the FISD Mergent 
database, and firms’ annual reports. We also search Factiva, annual reports, and delisting 
classifications in CRSP for whether a convertible is retired in some way other than 
through a call, namely, as a result of a merger, a bankruptcy, an exchange of the 
convertible for other securities, a full repurchase of the convertible, a full exercise of a 
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put feature by the convertible bondholders, or the full voluntary conversion of the bond. 
We search all databases until 1-1-2012.  
We find that 159 of the 471 bonds were called, 105 were retired as part of a merger, 
32 were retired as a result of the issuer’s bankruptcy, 13 were exchanged in capital 
restructurings, and 13 were repurchased. Eight bonds were completely put back to the 
firm, four bonds were completely voluntarily converted, and 45 bonds matured.  
In quantifying call delay, we focus on the length of call delay rather than the size of 
the call premium, because during the initial years of their lives 432 of the 471 
convertibles in our sample cannot be called (enjoy hard call protection) and 112 of the 
convertibles can only be called if the stock price exceeds the conversion price by a set 
percentage for a specified number of trading days within a given time period (soft call 
protection). The effect of both hard and soft call protection is that the call premium can 
be large when it first becomes possible to force conversion. We measure call delay as the 
number of trading days relative to this date. 
III. Observed Call Delays for Convertibles with and without Dividend Protection 
We first consider the set of convertible bonds that were called and ask whether there 
is any difference in call delay for dividend-protected versus non dividend-protected 
bonds. We then examine the set of bonds that at some stage prior to 1-1-2012 were not 
protected against a call and were not called when conversion could be forced. Our 
prediction is that delay should be less common and less lengthy for dividend-protected 
bonds. A further prediction of the set of dividend-related rationales for delay is that for 
non dividend-protected convertibles, delay should be higher when the dividends to be 
received upon conversion are higher.  
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A. Call Delay and Called Convertibles 
We classify a convertible as “in-the-money” when the daily closing stock price times 
the conversion rate exceeds the call price.15 We find that 59 of the 159 convertible calls 
are calls of convertible bonds that are out-of-the-money at the time of the call 
announcement. Like most prior studies on call policy, we do not focus on these events. In 
eight cases the call announcement occurs when the convertible is just out of-the-money 
and the convertible is in-the-money at the end of the notice period. Following Ingersoll 
(1977b), we classify these eight convertibles as if they were called in-the-money with a 
call delay of zero.16 This leaves 51 convertibles classified as called out-of-the-money and 
108 classified as called in-the-money, of which 45 are dividend-protected and 63 are not.  
Since dividend-related rationales for call delay do not apply to dividend-protected 
convertibles, call delays should be shorter for dividend-protected bonds. Panel A of Table 
III reports the first of the paper’s investigations of this basic prediction. Panel A shows 
the call delay in trading days for convertibles that are called in-the-money, distinguishing 
between convertibles with and without dividend protection.  
We measure the cumulative call delay as the total number of trading days prior to a 
call announcement on which the convertible is both in-the-money and callable. The 
average cumulative call delay is 67.22 days for non dividend-protected convertible bonds 
and only 2.47 days for dividend-protected convertibles. We also report the continuous 
call delay, defined as the maximum number of trading days before a call announcement 
on which the convertible is continuously in-the-money and callable. We find that non 
dividend-protected convertibles are continuously in-the-money for on average of 47.30 
days before being called, while dividend-protected convertibles are continuously in-the-
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money for an average of 2.47 days. The difference between the mean call delay for 
dividend-protected and non dividend-protected convertibles is statistically significant at 
the 1% level for both the cumulative and continuous call delay measures. 
Interestingly, the median call delay is zero: 39 of the 63 convertible bonds with no 
dividend protection and 34 of the 45 convertible bonds with dividend protection have 
zero call delay. Figure 1 shows that the distribution of call delays for non dividend-
protected convertibles is right-skewed relative to the distribution for dividend-protected 
convertibles. We therefore also examine measures other than standard t-statistics and 
report bootstrapped difference-of-means z-statistics. We also calculate, but do not report, 
the Wilcoxon rank-sum test statistic and the χ²-statistic of the difference in call delay for 
the two groups. The differences are significant under all of these measures. 
B. Call Delay and Convertibles That Have Not Been Called 
Section III.A provides strong evidence that those dividend-protected convertibles 
that are called in-the-money are called with virtually no delay. This is a necessary, but 
not sufficient, condition to establish that there is little delay in calling dividend-protected 
convertibles. To establish the stronger result we must also examine the delay of 
convertibles that are not called. We therefore examine the set of convertible bonds that at 
some stage prior to 1-1-2012 were not protected against a call and were not called in-the-
money. These bonds either matured, were exchanged or repurchased, were put back to 
the firm, were retired because the firm merged or went bankrupt, were fully voluntary 
converted, were called out-of-the-money, or were still outstanding on 1-1-2012. This set 
consists of the full sample of 471 convertible bonds minus the 108 convertible bonds that 
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were called in-the-money and the 45 bonds that were still call-protected on 1-1-2012. 
Thus, we examine 318 bonds in this subsection, of which 194 are dividend-protected.   
For only 11 of these 318 convertibles was there any missed opportunity to force 
conversion prior to 1-1-2012. The other 307 convertible bonds were never in-the-money 
in periods when they were not call-protected. Of the aberrant 11, five fell out-of-the-
money after the missed opportunity and were still outstanding on 1-1-2012, three 
matured, one was voluntary converted, one was called later after it had fallen out-of-the-
money, and one was retired in a merger. Only three of these 11 convertibles were 
dividend-protected. Thus, only three of the 194 dividend-protected bonds that have not 
been called to date were ever in-the-money and not call-protected at the time.  
Panel B of Table III reports the average number of trading days that the conversion 
option is in-the-money for the 11 non called convertibles with call delay. The average 
cumulative (continuous) call delay for the three dividend-protected bonds in the set is 
13.00 (11.33) days. In contrast, the average cumulative (continuous) call delay is 232.13 
(209.38) days for the eight non dividend-protected convertibles. The maximum call delay 
for the three dividend-protected convertibles is 32 days, while it is 747 days for the eight 
non dividend-protected bonds.17  
C. Cost of Delay for Dividend-Protected Versus Non Dividend-Protected Convertibles 
The Appendix shows that for dividend-protected convertibles, the cost to the firm’s 
shareholders of delaying a call is the sum of the fraction of the cost of future after-
corporate-tax coupons that is borne by the shareholders (as seen in footnote 8) plus the 
value of the insurance the bondholder retains so long as she has not converted. The 
average coupon rate on the dividend-protected convertible bonds in our sample is 3.28%, 
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and the average offering proceeds are $246 million. If a call occurred at the time 
conversion could first be forced, the average (median) fraction of the shares outstanding 
that would be held by convertible bondholders is 9.67% (7.78%). Thus, if a call is 
delayed, then on average 90.33% of the cost of future after-corporate-tax coupons is 
borne by the firm’s shareholders. Given a corporate tax rate of 35%, these averages 
indicate an after-tax coupon-related cost of not calling a dividend-protected convertible of 
0.9033 × 0.65 × 0.0328 × $246 million per year, which corresponds to  approximately 
$4.7 million per year. The total cost including the value of the insurance convertible 
bondholders retain so long as they are not forced to convert is greater than $4.7 million 
per year. 
Suppose dividend-protected convertibles were to exhibit the same call delay as non 
dividend-protected convertible bonds. For non dividend-protected bonds, the average 
length of time between the date when conversion could first be forced and the date of the 
earliest of the bond’s call, full voluntary conversion, maturity or retirement in a merger, 
or the 1-1-2012 end of the sample period is 139.7 days.18 Given a 252-day trading year, 
an after-corporate-tax annual coupon cost of $4.7 million implies that the average after-
tax coupon that would be unnecessarily paid if calls of dividend-protected convertibles 
were delayed by 139.7 days would be (139.7/252) × $4.7 million = $2.6 million.  
For non dividend-protected convertibles the cost of delay is the sum of the difference 
between the present values of after-corporate-tax coupons and the dividends to be paid to 
former bondholders prior to the convertible’s stated maturity in the event of conversion 
(as seen in Equation (A1) of the Appendix) plus the insurance component. When the 
difference between the after-tax coupon and the dividends to be paid in the event of 
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conversion is negative, there is an income-related benefit from a delay in calling non 
dividend-protected convertibles. The 32 instances of call delay for non dividend-
protected convertibles (i.e., 24 instances from Panel A and eight from Panel B of Table 
III) are associated with a present value of dividends that exceeds the present value of 
coupons by an average of $0.37 million. 
D. Call Delay and the Size of the Dividend for Non Dividend-Protected Convertibles 
Panel C of Table III reports the delay for two subsets of called non dividend-
protected convertible bonds: convertibles with dividends less than after-tax coupons 
(low-dividend convertibles) and convertibles with dividends in excess of after-tax 
coupons (high-dividend convertibles). Dividend-related rationales for call delay predict 
longer delays for the high-dividend sample of non dividend-protected bonds. Following 
King and Mauer (2014), we estimate the dividend to be received upon conversion on the 
basis of the largest annual dividend per share paid during the period starting from when 
the bond first became callable. 
On average, non dividend-protected bonds experience a 10 times longer call delay 
when dividends exceed after-tax coupons: the average cumulative (continuous) delay is 
181 days (127 days) for high-dividend convertibles and only 18 days (13 days) for low-
dividend convertibles. The difference is statistically significant and shows that the 
relevance of dividends for call delay of non dividend-protected bonds as observed in data 
from the 1980s and 1990s (Asquith and Mullins (1991), Campbell, Ederington, and 
Vankudre (1991), Ederington, Caton, and Campbell (1997)) extends to our post-1999 
sample of non dividend-protected convertible bonds.  
 21 
While 30 of the 44 non dividend-protected convertibles issued by low-dividend firms 
are called without delay, the 14 instances of delay present a potential conundrum. In fact, 
10 of the 14 low-dividend non dividend-protected instances of delay relate to firms that 
do not pay any dividends in the year prior to the first opportunity to force conversion. 
Still, as a manager’s decision to delay could reflect her private information concerning 
future dividend growth, some of the delay may be explained if dividends were expected 
to later increase.  
If dividend-related rationales for delay can help explain the call delays observed for 
non dividend-protected convertibles, then non dividend-paying firms that delay calling 
non dividend-protected convertible bonds should be more likely to initiate dividend 
payments than other firms. Three of the 10 non dividend-payers initiated dividends within 
a year of the first missed opportunity to call. To determine whether three out of 10 is an 
unusually high number of dividend initiators, we consider the set of firm characteristics 
investigated in the Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000), Fama and French 
(2001), and Grullon and Michaely (2002) investigations of dividend policy. Controlling 
for whether the firm has convertibles outstanding, we estimate the relation between year-
end firm characteristics and dividend initiation during our sample period. For the 10 non 
dividend-paying firms, the average value of the logit-estimated probability of beginning 
to pay dividends within one year given publicly available financial information and the 
fact that the firm has a convertible outstanding is 7.06%. Given a 7.06% probability of 
dividend initiation, the likelihood of observing as many as three initiations in a sample of 
10 is only 2.8983%. Hence, we can reject the null that call delay is not an indicator of a 
future dividend increase. 
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IV. Tobit Analysis of Call Delay 
We use a Tobit analysis to confirm our primary prediction of a negative relation 
between dividend protection and call delay controlling for other variables. The analysis is 
reported in Table IV. The dependent variable is the log of (one plus call delay). The 
explanatory variables are a dummy equal to one when the convertible is dividend-
protected, the ratio of the dividend to be received upon conversion to the after-tax 
coupon, the safety premium on the first date that conversion could be forced, the firm’s 
stock return volatility, financial slack, and year dummies based on the year of issue and 
the year in which conversion could first be forced. Year dummies are likely to be 
important as the overall likelihood of call delay seems to have declined over time.19  
Columns (1) and (2) report that our cumulative and continuous measures of call delay 
are significantly negatively related to dividend protection. Columns (3) and (4) report that 
for non dividend-protected convertible bonds, the relation between the size of the 
dividend and call delay is statistically significant at the 5% level, with higher dividend 
firms exhibiting longer call delays. Both the negative effect of dividend protection and 
the positive effect of dividends when convertibles are not dividend-protected are in line 
with the importance of dividend-related rationales for call delay.  
The safety premium is negatively related to call delay, and for the sample of non 
dividend-protected convertibles this relation is significant at the 5% level. This result 
suggests that firms act to reduce the chance of a failed call. The reason that the safety 
premium is statistically important for non dividend-protected bonds but not for dividend-
protected convertibles may be that dividends and (after-tax) coupons will be in “balance” 
for some of the non dividend-protected bonds, thereby leaving more room for the safety 
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premium to come into play. For the dividend-protected convertibles in our sample, a 
desire to avoid the average after-corporate-tax cost of coupon payments of $4.7 million a 
year, as calculated in Section III.C, is likely to drive the issuer to force conversion as 
soon as possible.20  
V. What Caused the Change in Security Design? 
The redesign of convertible bonds in recent years to incorporate dividend protection 
raises the interesting question of “Why?” Conversations with practitioners, including the 
CFOs of early adopters of dividend protection features, suggest that the design change 
was driven by a belief that dividends were likely to increase. One reason for such a belief 
may have been the 2003 passage of the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act 
(JGTRRA), which reduced the tax penalty on dividends.21  
All the convertibles issued in 2003 between January and April are non dividend-
protected. In May, the JGTRRA was signed into law and dividend-protected bonds began 
to be issued. We establish that 17% of all issues in May were protected. The percentage 
of protected issues increased to 22% in June, and to 92% in July—once the boilerplate 
was caste, the stamp seems to have been rapidly pressed into service. Finance personnel 
at firms that were early adopters of dividend protection have suggested to the authors that 
they viewed dividend protection as a simple method of reducing the difficulty of valuing 
the convertible at the time of a perceived increase in dividends.  
An alternate possible reason for the design change is the increased involvement of 
hedge funds in the market for convertible bonds since 2000 (Brown et. al. (2012)). Hedge 
funds combine long positions in convertibles with short positions in the issuer’s common 
stock. Changes in dividend policy have a direct effect on the value of non dividend-
 24 
protected convertibles. Since dividend protection immunizes a convertible bond’s 
conversion value against changes in dividend policy, dividends have a muted effect on 
the value of a dividend-protected convertible, simplifying valuation. Further, when a 
convertible is dividend-protected, the call policy that maximizes shareholder wealth is to 
force conversion as soon as possible. Thus, purely redistributive calls become a relatively 
predictable function of the stock price and hedge funds can more successfully hedge their 
positions. As such, hedge funds may prefer dividend-protected convertibles. 
Table V reports the results of a logit analysis of the extent to which incorporation of 
dividend protection in the design of a convertible is explained by both hedge fund 
involvement in the issue and the passage of the JGTRRA (as a proxy for a post-May 2003 
perception of higher dividends). We follow Brown et al. (2012) and obtain hedge fund 
involvement by downloading convertible registration statements for privately placed 
convertibles from SEC Edgar. Many registration statements contain the names of the 
original purchasers of the convertible bonds, and we classify these buyers as hedge funds 
or non hedge funds. We are able to obtain buyer information for 401 of the 471 
convertible bonds issued during the years 2000 to 2008.  
We consider two measures of hedge fund involvement: the fraction of the issue 
purchased by hedge funds, and the fraction of purchasers of the issue that are hedge 
funds. The Post-May 2003 dummy takes the value of one for convertibles issued in and 
after May 2003. Tufano (2003) investigates, inter alia, whether large or small firms lead 
financial innovation, and thus we include the natural logarithm of the issuing firm’s total 
assets as a control variable in the logit analysis. To examine whether firms with high 
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dividends are more likely to use dividend protection than firms that do not pay dividends, 
we also include the dividend yield in our regression model.  
After controlling for whether the issue date precedes or follows the tax law change, 
both measures of hedge fund involvement enter positively, but the relation is not 
statistically significant. The strongest driver of the redesign of convertibles bonds is the 
Post-May 2003 dummy, which is significantly positively related to the inclusion of 
dividend protection in a bond’s design. 
VI. Conclusions 
Prior studies of non dividend-protected convertibles find that a substantial number of 
firms do not call their convertible bonds as soon as the bond’s conversion value exceeds 
the call price. The analyses of Constantinides and Grundy (1986), Asquith and Mullins 
(1991), and Campbell, Ederington, and Vankudre (1991) suggest that call delays can be 
optimal provided the dividends that bondholders forgo by not converting are sufficiently 
high relative to the (after-tax) coupon cost of the bond to the issuing firm.  
A recent change in convertible security design has had a significant impact on 
convertible call delay. The majority of convertible bonds issued since 2003 are dividend-
protected, meaning that the conversion value of the bond is not reduced when the stock 
goes ex-dividend because the conversion rate is increased to offset the ex-dividend 
decline in the share price. This paper shows that the dividend-related rationales for call 
delay are inapplicable if the convertible is dividend-protected. Hence, if all delay in 
calling non dividend-protected convertibles were explained by one or more of the 
dividend-related rationales for delay, then dividend-protected convertibles would be 
called without delay. On the other hand, if non dividend-related rationales explained all 
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delay in calling non dividend-protected convertibles, then call delays for dividend-
protected and non dividend-protected convertibles would be similar. 
We document that call delay is shorter for dividend-protected convertibles than for 
non dividend-protected convertibles, thus establishing that call delay is at least partially 
explained by the set of dividend-related rationales for delay. Call delay is in fact near 
zero for dividend-protected convertibles, consistent with dividends being the primary 
driver of the call delay documented in earlier studies of call policy for non dividend-
protected convertibles. As almost all recently issued convertible bonds contain dividend 
protection features, we predict that long call delays will be rare events in future years. 
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Appendix. The Tax Deductibility of Coupons and Call Delay 
 
In this appendix we first establish conditions under which the tax deductibility of 
coupon payments provides a rationale for delaying the call of a non dividend-protected 
convertible. We then show that under the same conditions it is not optimal to delay 
calling a dividend-protected convertible.  
ASSUMPTION 1: The tax shield provided by the convertible’s coupon payments is lost 
if the bond is called, that is, it is prohibitively costly to recapitalize a firm after a forced 
conversion. 
Let callV denote the total value of both the convertible bondholders’ and the original 
shareholders’ claims on the firm if a call is announced. Let no callV  denote the total value 
if the convertible is not called. Let c denote the total coupon payable on the convertible 
and let τ denote the corporate tax rate. callV and no callV  are related as follows: 
( )  call no callV V PV cτ= − , 
which is analogous to the relation between otherwise equivalent levered and unlevered 
firms. 
ASSUMPTION 2: Without loss of generality, the firm will make a single distribution of 
dividends and coupons on a common date prior to the convertible’s maturity. 
ASSUMPTION 3: The firm’s investment policy is independent of its call policy and 
hence ( )1call no calld d c τ= + − . 
The variable calld  denotes the total dividend paid over the remaining life of the bond 
if the convertible is converted prior to the coupon payment (in which case the tax shield 
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is lost given Assumption 1). Let no calld  denote the total dividend paid if the convertible 
is not called. If forced conversion means the loss of a valuable tax shield, then the only 
way that the firm’s investment policy can be unaffected by a call is if the total of the 
firm’s distributions as dividends and coupons is reduced in the event of a call by an 
amount equal to the lost tax-saving, that is, if ( )1call no calld d c τ= + − . 
ASSUMPTION 4: × <
+ call
CR d c
n CR
. 
Satisfaction of this inequality is sufficient to guarantee that a non dividend-protected 
bond will not be voluntarily converted. Conversion would lead the former bondholders to 
suffer both a reduction in their income stream and the loss of the insurance provided by 
the bond.  
ASSUMPTION 5: The firm’s value is such that a call would force conversion. 
ASSUMPTION 6: If the convertible is not called, it is certain to be converted at maturity.   
The following section establishes the relation between dividends and coupons that 
must be satisfied if the call of a non dividend-protected convertible is to be optimally 
delayed when Assumptions 1 to 6 are satisfied. Section B then shows that it is never 
optimal to delay calling a dividend-protected convertible even if Assumptions 1 to 6 are 
satisfied. 
A. Non Dividend-Protected Convertibles, the Tax Deductibility of Coupons, and Delay 
If the firm calls and forces conversion, the original shareholders’ claim on the firm is 
worth call
n V
n CR+
. If instead the firm does not call, their claim is worth 
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( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
   ex-distribution firm value
1
1
no call
no call no call no call
no call call no call
call no call
call call
nPV d PV
n CR
nPV d V PV c PV d
n CR
nPV d V PV c PV c PV d
n CR
n CR nV PV d PV c
n CR n CR n CR
n CR nV PV d PV c
n CR n CR n CR
τ
τ
τ
+
+
= + − −
+
= + + − −
+
= + − −
+ + +
= + − − −
+ + +
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1
1 .call call
PV c
n CRV PV d PV c
n CR n CR
τ
τ
−
= + − −
+ +
 
Thus, when Assumptions 1 to 6 are satisfied, the original shareholders will prefer to delay 
calling whenever  
( ) ( ) ( )1call
CR PV d PV c
n CR
τ> −
+
.                              (A1) 
The left-hand side of inequality (A1) is the present value of the dividend income stream 
paid to former convertible bondholders over the period between the forced conversion 
and the bond’s stated maturity. The right-hand side is the after-tax cost of the coupon 
stream paid to convertible bondholders in the absence of a call.  
When Assumption 6 is not satisfied (i.e., when it is not certain that the bond will be 
converted at its maturity), condition (A1) becomes a necessary, but not sufficient, 
condition for delay to be optimal. This is because when Assumption 6 is not satisfied, 
calling has the additional advantage of depriving the convertible bondholders of the 
valuable insurance provided by their right not to convert at maturity.  
The empirical analysis of Asquith and Mullins (1991), Campbell, Ederington, and 
Vankudre (1991), and Asquith (1995) can be thought of as an operationalization of the 
inequality in (A1). These analyses examine pro-forma dividends defined as the product of 
the observed per-share dividend prior to a call and the conversion ratio as a proxy for the 
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quantity on the left-hand side of inequality (A1). These analyses examine non dividend-
protected convertibles only and compare the call behavior of firms with pro-forma 
dividends less than the convertible’s after-tax coupons to the call behavior of firms with 
pro-forma dividends greater than after-tax coupons. Their finding is that call delays are 
longer for firms with pro-forma dividends greater than after-tax coupons, indicating that 
high dividends are associated with longer delays. 
B. Dividend-Protected Convertibles, the Tax Deductibility of Coupons, and Delay 
Again assume that Assumptions 1 to 6 are satisfied but now consider a dividend-
protected convertible. If the firm calls and forces conversion, then the original 
shareholders’ claim on the firm is worth  
0
call
n V
n CR+
.                                                       (A2) 
If the firm does not call, the conversion ratio will change when the dividend is 
distributed. The new conversion ratio, 1CR , is determined by  
1 0 .
cum div
cum div no call
SCR CR
d
S n
= ×
 
−  
 
                                       (A3) 
Given Assumption 6, 
1
ex-distribution firm value .cum div no call
d
S nn CR
 
= +  +  
              (A4) 
Substituting (A4) into (A3) gives 
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1 0
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0
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After the bond’s conversion at maturity, the fraction of the firm owned by the 
original shareholders will be 
( )
( )
1 0
0
0
0 0
ex-distribution firm value
ex-distribution firm value
            .
ex-distribution firm value
no call
no call
no call
n n
n CR CR n d
n
n CR d
dCRn
n CR n CR
=
+ × +
+
− ×
= − ×
+ +
 
As in Section A of this appendix, if the firm delays calling, the original shareholders’ 
claim on the firm is worth 
( )
( )
( )
1
0
0 0
0
   ex-distribution firm value
      ex-distribution firm value
ex-distribution firm value
ex-distribution fi
no call
no call
no call
no call
nPV d PV
n CR
PV d
dCRnPV
n CR n CR
nPV d PV
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 
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Comparing (A2) and (A5), we see that the original shareholders are always better off 
forcing the conversion of a dividend-protected convertible. For dividend-protected 
convertibles a failure to force conversion imposes a cost on the original shareholders 
equal to a portion of the after-tax cost of coupon payments and delay is never optimal. In 
contrast, as shown in Section A of this appendix, a non dividend-protected convertible 
may not be called if dividends are sufficiently high. 
Note that the valuation of the original shareholders’ claim when the bond is not 
called as given in (A5) reflects Assumption 6. When Assumption 6 is not satisfied, the 
convertible bond has additional value due to the insurance provided by the convertible 
bondholder’s right not to convert at maturity. Thus, when Assumption 6 is not satisfied, it 
must be the case that if the bond is not called, the value of the shareholders’ claim on the 
firm is even less than the value in (A5). Again, the value in (A5) is less than the value of 
the shareholders’ claim if the bond is called and conversion is forced as given in (A2). 
Thus, we have established in the setting described by Assumptions 1 to 5 that 
shareholders are always better off by forcing the conversion of in-the-money dividend-
protected convertibles, that is, by never delaying the call of a dividend-protected 
convertible. 
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Figure 1. Call delay for convertibles with and without dividend protection. This 
figure shows the percentage of convertibles with zero call delay, call delay between 1 and 
25 days, call delay between 26 and 100 days, and call delay exceeding 100 days. 
Dividend protection indicates that the conversion rate for the convertible bond will be 
adjusted for regular cash dividends. Cumulative call delay is the number of trading days 
before the call announcement date that the convertible bond is in-the-money and callable. 
Continuous call delay is the number of trading days before the call announcement date 
that the convertible bond is continuously in-the-money and callable. 
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Table I 
Summary Statistics and Issuance of Dividend-Protected Bonds over Time 
This table presents descriptive statistics for convertible issues over the period 2000 to 
2008. Issue proceeds are gross proceeds in millions of dollars, as reported in SDC. The 
coupon rate is the yearly coupon as a percentage of the principal. Time to maturity is the 
number of years between issue and maturity. Years to first call are the number of years 
that the bond is fully call-protected. Optional redemption is a dummy equal to one if the 
convertible includes a call feature (that does not put a requirement on the minimum stock 
price). Provisional redemption is a dummy equal to one if the convertible bond includes a 
feature specifying that the firm can call the bond provided the stock price exceeds the 
conversion price by a specified percentage for a specified number of trading days within 
a given period. Put rights is a dummy equal to one if the convertible bondholder can 
require the issuer to repurchase the convertible on specified dates at a specified price. 
Dividend protection is a dummy equal to one if the conversion rate for the convertible 
bond will be adjusted for regular cash dividends. All information except issue proceeds is 
obtained from the issue prospectuses. Panel B reports the number of convertible bonds 
issued each year with and without dividend protection. 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
 N Mean Median St.dev. 
Issue proceeds 471 259 150 319 
Coupon rate 471 3.38 3.38 1.81 
Time to maturity 471 15.91 20.00 8.20 
Years to first call 471 4.42 5.00 2.02 
Optional redemption 471 0.92 1.00 0.28 
Provisional redemption 471 0.24 0.00 0.43 
Put rights 471 0.55 1.00 0.50 
Dividend protection 471 0.60 1.00 0.49 
Panel B: Dividend protection over time 
Issue year N Dividend- protected 
 Non dividend- 
protected 
% dividend-
protected 
2000   39     0     39     0.0% 
2001   69   8   61 11.6% 
2002   36   0  36    0.0% 
2003 122  75  47   61.5% 
2004 106 102    4   96.2% 
2005  38  38    0 100.0% 
2006  26  25    1   96.2% 
2007  20  20    0 100.0% 
2008  15  15    0 100.0% 
Total 471 283  188   60.1% 
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Table II 
Convertible Retirements 
This table shows how the convertible bonds in our sample are retired. The sample 
consists of convertible bonds issued over the period 2000 to 2008, and we report their 
status as of January 1, 2012. The classifications are based on information from Factiva, 
FISD Mergent, CRSP, and firms’ annual reports. We obtain information on call 
protection and maturity dates from the issue prospectuses. 
 
  Number of observations   
Called  159   
     
Merger and acquisition     105   
Bankruptcy  32   
Exchange   13   
Full repurchase   13   
Full exercise of bondholders’ right to put                          8   
Full voluntary conversion    4   
Matured   45   
Outstanding and call-protected at 1-1-2012  45   
Outstanding and callable at 1-1-2012  47   
   471    
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Table III 
Call Delay 
Panel A reports call delay for convertibles that are called in-the-money. Panel B reports 
call delay for non called convertible bonds that are both in-the-money and not call-
protected at some time prior to 1-1-2012. Panel C reports call delay for two subsamples 
of non dividend-protected convertibles that are called in-the-money: high-dividend 
convertibles with dividends in excess of after-tax coupons, and low-dividend convertibles 
with dividends less than after-tax coupons. Dividend protection indicates that the 
conversion rate for the convertible bond is adjusted for regular cash dividends. 
Cumulative call delay is the number of trading days that the convertible is in-the-money, 
callable and uncalled. Continuous call delay is the number of trading days that the 
convertible is continuously in-the-money, callable, and uncalled. The difference in means 
t-statistics do not assume equal variances. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Convertibles classified as called in-the-money 
 Mean Median St. dev. Maximum 
Non dividend-protected (63 observations) 
Cumulative call delay  67.22    0    186.30    1221 
Continuous call delay 47.30 0 114.57  515 
     
Dividend-protected (45 observations) 
Cumulative call delay   2.47  0     6.28     24 
Continuous call delay  2.47  0     6.28     24 
     
Difference in means t-statistic 
Cumulative call delay      2.757***    
Continuous call delay     3.100***    
     
Bootstrapped z-statistic     
Cumulative call delay     5.455***    
Continuous call delay    6.594***    
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Panel B: Convertibles that are not called but are both in-the-money and not call-
protected at some time prior to 1-1-2012 
Non dividend-protected (8 observations) 
Cumulative call delay    232.13 168    260.08      747 
Continuous call delay   209.38         143 252.70   747 
     
Dividend-protected (3 observations) 
Cumulative call delay  13.00  6   16.64     32 
Continuous call delay 11.33  1   17.90     32 
     
Difference in means t-statistic 
Cumulative call delay   2.370**    
Continuous call delay      2.202*    
     
Bootstrapped z-statistic     
Cumulative call delay    2.639***     
Continuous call delay   2.846***    
Panel C: Call delay for non dividend-protected convertibles segregated by dividends 
relative to after-tax coupons 
 Mean Median St. dev. Maximum 
High dividends (19 observations) 
Cumulative call delay     181.37         23  308.03  1221 
Continuous call delay    126.89        23    182.60 515 
     
Low dividends (44 observations) 
Cumulative call delay       17.93          0       45.65  232 
Continuous call delay      12.93          0 30.99  153 
     
Difference in means t-statistic 
Cumulative call delay         2.302**    
Continuous call delay    2.704**    
     
Bootstrapped z-statistic     
Cumulative call delay       3.609***    
Continuous call delay      3.651***    
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Table IV 
Tobit Analysis of Call Delay 
The sample consists of the 108 convertibles issued over the period 2000 to 2008 and 
called in-the-money before January 1, 2012. The table reports the results of a Tobit 
analysis of call delay. The dependent variable is the logarithm of (1 + call delay). 
Dividend protection is a dummy equal to one when the conversion rate for the convertible 
bond is adjusted for regular cash dividends, and zero otherwise. The dividend relative to 
after-tax coupon variable is the largest annual dividend paid during the bond’s life while 
it is callable multiplied by the conversion ratio and divided by the after-tax coupon. 
Safety premium is the conversion value on the date conversion could first be forced 
divided by the call price, minus one. The monthly stock return volatility is for the year 
before conversion could first be forced. Financial slack is measured as cash plus short-
term investments divided by the call price for the entire issue. The year of call dummies 
relate to the year in which conversion could first be forced. The dividend to after-tax 
coupon ratio is winsorized at a value of five and the safety premium at a value of one. 
Models (3) and (4) focus on the subset of convertibles without dividend protection. We 
report heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
 Ln(1 + call delay) 
 Dividend-protected and non                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
dividend-protected convertibles 
Non dividend-protected
convertibles 
  Cumulative 
call delay 
(1) 
Continuous 
call delay 
(2) 
 Cumulative 
call delay 
(3) 
Continuous 
call delay 
(4) 
Dividend protection −3.442*** 
  (1.310) 
 −3.176** 
(1.246) 
   
Dividend / after-tax coupon    0.522* 
  (0.279) 
 0.499* 
(0.271) 
   0.734** 
   (0.301) 
   0.701** 
(0.300) 
Safety premium  −2.213* 
  (1.296) 
   −2.058 
(1.252) 
 −3.586** 
   (1.470) 
   −3.314** 
 (1.423) 
Stock return volatility  12.749 
(12.860) 
   13.249 
 (12.348) 
     0.403 
 (19.496) 
1.641 
   (18.892) 
Cash & short-term 
investments / payment 
upon calling 
−0.137 
 (0.184) 
  −0.123 
    0.173) 
   −0.385 
   (0.300) 
    −0.352 
     (0.279) 
      
Year of issue dummies     Yes    Yes      Yes        Yes 
Year of call dummies     Yes    Yes      Yes        Yes 
      
Pseudo R2 8.92%     8.71%    14.53%   14.04% 
N 108 108    63         63  
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Table V 
Dividend Protection, Hedge Fund Involvement, and JGTRRA 2003 
This table reports results of a logit analysis of the relation between dividend protection, 
hedge fund involvement, and the passage of JGTRRA. Dividend protection indicates that 
the conversion rate for the convertible bond will be adjusted for regular cash dividends. 
The Post-May 2003 dummy takes a value of one for all bonds issued on or after the 
passage of JGTRRA in May 2003. Following Brown et al. (2012), we capture hedge fund 
involvement using the fraction of a convertible issue purchased by hedge funds and the 
fraction of the purchasers involved in a convertible issue that can be classified as hedge 
funds. Dividend yield is measured as dividends over a fiscal year relative to the fiscal 
year-end value of equity. Total assets, dividends, and the market value of equity are 
measured before the offering. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. *** and ** indicate significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
 
 
                    Dividend protection 
Constant         −3.077**       
       (1.287) 
        −2.355** 
       (1.023) 
 
Post-May 2003 dummy 4.448*** 
       (0.418) 
            4.475*** 
      (0.424) 
 
Fraction of proceeds purchased 
by hedge funds 
      1.142 
      (1.044) 
  
Fraction of purchasers that are 
hedge funds 
       0.241 
       (0.860) 
 
Log(assets)     −0.164 
       (0.302) 
     −0.181 
       (0.296) 
 
Dividend yield     −0.294 
      (0.196) 
     −0.287 
       (0.194) 
 
    
Pseudo R2      48.81%       48.59%  
N         401          401  
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1 A call will fail to force conversion if the conversion value drops below the call price at the end 
of the notice period and convertible bondholders tender their bonds for cash. For models and 
empirical investigations of the safety premium rationale for call delay, see Ingersoll (1977b), 
Jaffee and Shleifer (1990), Asquith and Mullins (1991), Asquith (1995), Ederington, Caton, and 
Campbell (1997), Butler (2002), Altintig and Butler (2005), and King and Mauer (2014).  
2 For empirical investigations of this signaling rationale for call delay, see Ofer and Natarajan 
(1987), Acharya (1988), Campbell, Ederington and Vankudre (1991), Ederington, Caton, and 
Campbell (1997), Ederington and Goh (2001), and King and Mauer (2014). 
3 Dunn and Eades (1989) document the existence of many sleeping convertible preferred 
stockholders. 
4 Constantinides and Grundy (1986) show that call delay is related to future dividends and that 
call delay by low-dividend firms is a predictor of future dividend growth and voluntary 
conversion. Campbell, Ederington, and Vankudre (1991) show that firms that do not delay tend to 
subsequently experience dividend decreases. 
5 Asquith and Mullins (1991) show that calls are less likely when dividends exceed after-tax 
coupons. Consistent with this observation, Campbell, Ederington, and Vankudre (1991), Asquith 
(1995), and King and Mauer (2014) report longer average call delays for bonds when dividends 
exceed after-tax coupons.  
6 An adjustment of the form given in Equation (1) was suggested in Kahan’s (1995) analysis of 
potential anti dilution provisions that might be included in convertible securities. When the stock 
price drop on the ex-dividend date is smaller than one-for-one (see, for example, Campbell and 
Beranek (1955), Elton and Gruber (1970), Bali and Hite (1998)), the holders of convertible bonds 
with dividend protection are actually (slightly) better off when a dividend is paid, in that the 
conversion value of the bond increases. This observation increases the incentive to call and force 
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conversion and does not alter our prediction of low call delay for dividend-protected convertible 
bonds. 
7 Dividend protection does not mean that dividend-protected convertibles can be valued as if there 
were no dividends. Although the conversion value of the bond is unaffected by dividend 
payments, the value of the bond itself is affected. The situation is analogous to that of dividend-
protected options (see Geske, Roll, and Shastri (1983), Merton (1973)). 
8 Let callV  denote firm value when a call is announced, τ  the corporate tax rate, and c the coupon 
payment. The Appendix shows that the original shareholders’ claim on the firm is worth 
0
call
n V
n CR+
 if the firm calls. If the firm delays calling a dividend-protected convertible bond, the 
original shareholders’ claim on the firm is worth at most the lesser amount
( ) ( )( )
0
1call
n V PV c
n CR
τ− −
+
. 
9 In the Internet Appendix we show this formally by setting out the parameter restrictions such 
that a dividend-related signaling equilibrium exists when a convertible is not dividend-protected. 
We then show that no such equilibrium exists if the convertible is dividend-protected. The 
Internet Appendix is available in the online version of this article on the Journal of Finance 
website. 
10 In a scenario in which high dividends induce voluntary conversion, a HR signaling rationale for 
a delay in calling a non dividend-protected convertible is ruled out. Instead, firms in such a 
scenario are likely to delay calling a non dividend-protected convertible for a different reason:  
the high dividend itself brings into play the set of dividend-related rationales for delay. Now 
consider high dividends and a dividend-protected convertible. Since a dividend-protected 
convertible will never be voluntarily converted, a HR signaling equilibrium might explain a delay 
for a dividend-protected convertible yet be ruled out for a non dividend-protected convertible. 
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Hence, when dividends are high, dividend protection might change the rationale for the delay but 
not its existence (see Internet Appendix Section II.C). 
11 We present these results in Internet Appendix Section II. Section II.A of the Internet Appendix 
determines the parameter space consistent with the existence of a HR signaling equilibrium when 
the convertible is not dividend-protected. Section II.B of the Internet Appendix determines the 
parameter space consistent with the existence of a HR signaling equilibrium when the convertible 
is dividend-protected. Section II.C of the Internet Appendix compares the likelihood of call delay 
for non dividend-protected and dividend-protected convertibles and concludes that call delay for 
non dividend-protected convertibles is comparable to that of dividend-protected convertibles. 
12 We also collected convertibles issued from January 2009 until December 2011 with call 
features and an offering prospectus available on the SEC’s Edgar database. All of these issues are 
still in their call protection period as of 1-1-2012, and thus are not informative about call delay. 
Note that all these convertibles are dividend-protected.  
13 To estimate the marginal corporate tax rate, we use Graham’s simulated tax database (available 
at http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~jgraham/taxform.html) and multiply the annual coupon payment 
by one minus the firm’s marginal corporate tax rate in the year of the offering. A robustness test 
that uses a 35% corporate rate throughout does not change our conclusions. 
14 None of our conclusions are changed if we exclude all convertibles with minimum threshold 
amounts and yields from our analysis. 
15 We obtain information on conversion rates and call schedules from the issue prospectuses. We 
adjust the conversion rate for stock dividends, stock splits, and extraordinary cash dividends. For 
dividend-protected convertible bonds we also adjust the conversion rate for regular cash 
dividends. When there is a minimum threshold amount or yield specified for regular cash 
dividends, we adjust the conversion rate only for those dividends that exceed the minimum 
threshold. 
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16 Ingersoll (1977b) shows that absent underwriting costs, the optimal call policy in the presence 
of a call notice period is to call when the bond is just out-of-the-money. Seven of the eight bonds 
that were called just out-of-the-money were not dividend-protected, and including these eight 
bonds reduces the average delay for non dividend-protected bonds relative to dividend-protected 
bonds. Therefore, excluding the eight bonds only strengthens the paper’s finding of a lower call 
delay for dividend-protected bonds relative to non dividend-protected bonds. 
17 When combining the observations in Panels A and B, we have the full set of convertibles in our 
sample that were both in-the-money and not call-protected at any time prior to 1-1-2012. The 
mean (median) cumulative call delay for all non dividend-protected convertibles is 85.80 (65.56) 
days. For all dividend-protected convertibles, the mean (median) cumulative delay is 3.13 (3.02) 
days. The shorter cumulative delay for dividend-protected convertibles relative to non dividend-
protected convertibles is significant at the 1% level. A comparison of the continuous delay 
measures of the complete set of convertibles in the dividend-protected and non dividend-
protected groups leads to the same conclusion. 
18 The time between when conversion could have first been forced and the bond’s eventual 
demise will include any days in this interval on which the conversion option was out-of-the-
money. It is this measure that is relevant to determining the additional coupons paid because 
conversion was not forced at the earliest opportunity. 
19 Campbell, Ederington, and Vankudre (1991) examine calls between 1962 and 1985 and report 
an average delay of 3.32 years, whereas Asquith (1995) reports a shorter average delay over the 
1980 to 1993 period of 170.5 days. King and Mauer (2014) examine convertibles issued between 
1980 and 2002 and find that for the bonds issued between 1980 and 1989 the average delay is 147 
days, whereas for the bonds issued between 1990 and 2002 the average delay is only 41 days.  
20 In Internet Appendix Section III, we further investigate the safety premium and confirm that a 
desire for a safety premium may help explain the delay by non dividend-paying firms with non 
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dividend-protected convertibles. Internet Appendix Section IV shows that the decline in call delay 
for non dividend-protected convertibles has occurred over a period during which both the 
likelihood and the size of dividend payments declined, which is consistent with the importance of 
dividend-related rationales for delay. 
21 An article in a practitioner journal, Ferreira and Ouzou (2011), attributes the design change to 
the passage of the JGTRRA and a belief that dividends would increase. 
